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I. THE ISSUES 
This paper was commissioned as a link between the "why" papers 
concerning the "ends" of public enterprise (i.e., motives and goals) 
on the one hand and the "how" papers concerning "means" (e.g., organ-
izational structure, performance evaluation) on the other. The basic 
question is: to what extent do different ends imply different means 
so that the appropriate control mechanisms vary in some systematic way 
across sets of enterprises with different objectives? More spe-
cifically, if public enterprises in manufacturing have different ob-
jectives than those in utilities, trade or finance, then does this im-
ply different organizational structures, performance evaluation sys-
tems or degrees of enterprise autonomy? 
These questions are asked in the hope that policy guidance can be 
derived from a specification of goals so that the perpetual con-
troversies on appropriate public enterprise control policies can be 
narrowed, if not eliminated, by focusing on particular public enter-
prise sub-sets defined according to their objectives. That is, the 
underlying premises are: that policies must follow from objectives} 
that all too often common policies are applied to enterprises having 
diverse objectives; and that the mismatch between policies and objec-
tives is particularly acute in the manufacturing sector. 
There are abundant examples of public enterprise writings which 
follow this logic. One general form might run as follows: most pub-
lic enterprises should pursue both commercial and non-commercial obr« 
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jectives, but the mix varies from enterprise to enterprise; as the 
role of commercial objectives increases, the enterprise should be in-
creasingly responsible to markets instead of ministers; and this in 
turn implies such policies: as more autonomy, and a greater role for 
profit as a performance indicator. For example, the original 
Morrisonian "Theory of the Public Corporation"—^ argued that the 
commercial activities of the government required more autonomy than 
that provided by the departmental legal form and subsequent literature 
has suggested a plethora of alternative control devices supposedly ap-
propriate for commercial activities. None of these devices has proven 
broadly successful, leading some to the view that the mixing of 
commercial and non-commercial objectives in one institution is 
inherently uncontrollable, leading to failure to achieve either 
objective. The solution which follows is a strict institutional 
segregation of objectives with public enterprises being confined to 
commercial objectives and leaving all non-commercial objectives to 
other government agencies. What Morrison and Fernandez share is the 
notion that some control structures are more appropriate for some 
objectives than others. 
I/He rbert Morrison, Socialization and Transport (Lon-
don: • • , 1933). For an excellent survey of the evolution 
of this body of literature, see: R. S. Arora, Administration of Gov-
ernment Industries (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Admin-
istration, 1969). 
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This paper assesses the strengths and limitations of such argu-
ments. It can be thought of as a verbal matrix in which one 
dimension is objectives and the other is control policies. The 
two dimensions are defined in turn and their interdependence is 
then considered. , 
II. OBJECTIVES 
A. General 
The space constraint precludes discussion of specific objec-
tives. Instead, this section distinguishes between various classes of 
objectives in an effort to clarify the issues. 
B. Commercial versus Non-Commercial Objectives 
The distinction between commercial and non-commercial objectives 
is both common and useful, but is not generally well defined. At the 
extremes of course, the distinction is clear: commercial objectives 
are similar to those of private firms and they include such things as 
increasing sales and keeping unit costs to a minimum. Non-commercial 
objectives concern external effects of enterprise operations such ast 
opening up a backward area, or increasing national security. Fair 
enough, but what of cases where the objective is recognized by the 
private firm, but only partially (for example, generation of foreign 
exchange with an overvalued exchange rate)? Or, what about an objec-
tive which could be recognized by a private firm if the government 
chose to motivate it to do so (for example, reducing pollution through 
an effluent charge)? Are the objectives of earning foreign exchange 
or reducing pollution then commercial or non-commercial? 
There are many ways to answer this question, but I would suggest 
the following definition as being operationally useful—commercial ob-
jectives are reflected in the accounting system of the enterprise 
while non-commercial objectives are not. Achievement of commercial 
ob- jectives may be evaluated at either privately relevant or publicly 
relevant prices. Generation of foreign exchange is then a commercial 
objective whose value will vary depending on the price which the ac-
counting system places on a dollar of foreign earnings or savings. 
Pollution control, on the other hand, can be either commercial or non-
commercial depending on whether or not it is both quantified (e.g. in 
terms of particulate count) and charged within the accounting frame-
work (e.g. as a tax per unit of particulate). 
Under this definition, the commercial versus non-commercial par-
titioning of objectives is not immutable, but varies with the policy 
environment. This is a critical observation, because it says that the 
commercial versus non-commercial bifurcation of objectives is not an 
exogenous variable but an instrumental variable. That is, one major 
set of public enterprise policy decisions involves the degree to which 
objectives are commercialized. A common theme of public enterprise 
reform efforts (e.g. the French NORA Report) is that non-commercial 
objectives should either be compensated or ignored. One may not wish 
to go this far, of course, but the main point cannot be ig-
nored—commercialization is one major policy tool for dealing with the 
problems raised by non-commercial objectives. 
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C. Existential versus Operational Objectives 
Existential objectives are achieved by the very existence of the 
enterprise and do not alter operational behavior. They affect invest-
ment decisions but not operating decisions. Project evaluation cri-
teria are altered, but not performance evaluation criteria. For ex-
ample, the government might decide to build a large integrated iron 
and steel plant to achieve objectives such as national security and 
self-sufficiency in strategic materials. These non-commercial exis-
tential objectives are achieved so long as the plant is built and ac-
tually produces steel, and the operational objectives are strictly 
commercial (e.g., to produce as much steel as possible while keeping 
costs down). Similarly a plant may be located in a backward area in 
part to achieve the objective of regional development through job cre-
ation and spread effects. Once the location decision is made, how-
ever, this objective has been achieved and the plant can still be 
operated according to commercial principles. Other objectives are 
operational and can only be achieved by altering on-going behavior. A 
particularly important sub-category is pursuit of income distribution 
i 
objectives which require sale at a subsidized rate. Or, in the 
context of regional development, an enterprise may be required to 
spend some of its operational funds on roads, schools, housing, 
sanitation, etc. 
The distinction between existential and operational objectives is 
germane because of its relationship with the commercial versus non-
commercial bifurcation. The reason is that many non-commercial objec-
tives for manufacturing firms are existential rather than opera-
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tional. To the extent this is so, an enterprise established in part 
to achieve non-commercial objectives can nonetheless operate according 
to commercial principles. To be sure, it may earn a lower rate of 
commercial return (say, ip a backward region) but the interests of 
society can be served by its operating so as to make that return as 
high as possible (assuming the return is measured correctly). The de-
'gree to which non-commercial objectives are existential is open to 
question, but I would suggest that in the manufacturing sector, the 
correspondence is great and that failure to appreciate this is a fun-
damental source of difficulty. To illustrate, in pursuit of job cre-
ation it is legitimate to choose a technology involving 50 men and 50 
shovels over a technology employing one bulldozer and one man; the 
existential choice of technology decision having been made, the 
enterprise should then operate to maximize its surplus, generating 
resources to be used to buy more shovels and generate more employment 
(or pursue other social objectives). Instead, many public 
enterprises buy the bulldozer and then hire 50 workers, absorbing 
surplus in welfare payments to redundant workers and precluding 
further investment in real jobs. The problem is that an operational 
tool has been used to do an existential job. 
The argument is not that there are no legitimate operational non-
commercial objectives in public manufacturing enterprises, only that 
their share is small relative to both existential non-commercial and 
operational commercial objectives. If so, then there are clear impli-
cations for control procedures. One of these is that commercial ac-
counts serve as a useful starting point for performance evaluation 
(though these accounts need to be adjusted to reflect publicly rather 
than privately relevant profit). Any remaining non-commercial opera-
tional objectives can then be allowed for by "commercialization" 
through a social adjustment account, program contract, or other 
mechanism. Such devices are necessarily imperfect but may be adequate 
in a manufacturing firm where their weight is relatively small. It 
would be quite different in a regional development bank, where 
non-commercial operational objectives dominate and errors in 
measurement would be so large as to make the effort questionable as a 
control tool. 
®• Multiple Objectives versus Plural Principals 
No discussion of public enterprise objectives can be complete 
without reference to the problem of multiple objectives. Public en-
terprises are called upon to pursue a mix of commercial and non-
commercial objectives which can include such diverse goals as earning 
profits, redistributing income, subsidizing particular regions and 
sectors, earning foreign exchange, generating employment, and increas-
ing the probability that the party in power will be re-elected. 
Having such a plethora of objectives can be equivalent to having no 
objective and management is all too often left free to pursue either 
its own interests or a constantly shifting, incoherent mix. 
While the problem of multiple objectives is certainly real, it is 
2/ also misstated. As Leonid Hurwicz has pointed out, the real dif-
In discussions at the Second BAPEG Conference on Public 
Enterprises in Mixed Economy LDC's, April 1980. 
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ficulty is not one of multiple objectives but of plural principals. 
The simplest private enterprise faces a conflict between reducing in-
puts and costs while increasing output and revenues. A variety of 
programming techniques are available for handling more complicated 
cases and much of the economics profession is concerned with estab-
lishing weights (prices) to allocate resources so as to maximize ob-
jective functions involving multiple objectives. The real difficulty 
occurs when different individuals have different preferences. For a 
private enterprise, this is a comparatively minor problem since the 
various stockholders are likely to have similar trade-offs which can 
be captured in the objective of profit (which is still a complex 
variable incorporating weights on various, conflicting objectives). 
Similar agreement is unlikely on the weights of the various elements 
of the social profit function of a public enterprise. The Ministry of 
Labor may be primarily interested in employment, the Ministry of 
Finance in profit, the politicians in low prices in an election year, 
and so forth. The underlying problem is thus one of plural principals 
with different objective functions. 
The problem of multiple objectives then is largely (though not 
entirely, as we shall see below) one of plural principals which in 
turn is in part a measurement problem. To clarify matters further, a 
digression on measurement is necessary. 
E. Measurement of Objectives: A Digression 
Mea surenent of objectives has two steps. Both a price and a 
quantity must be established. The quantity determines the degree of 
achievement of the objective, while the price establishes the weight 
(trade-off) between that objective and others. The product of price 
times quantity yields a "value" which is the true end of measurement. 
For some objectives we can quantify the achievement, but not be able 
to put a price on it. For example, pollution reduction can be quan-
tified in terms of particulate count, but it is much more difficult to 
decide just how many dollars a particular reduction is worth to so-
ciety. That is, a quantity can be established, but not a price. For 
other objectives both quantity and price are difficult to determine; 
for example, the prestige added by having a national airline or the 
increment to security from having a domestic munitions factory. The 
problem of plural principals can then exist when either quantities or 
prices cannot be agreed upon. For industrial projects the failure to 
agree on price is probably the more common problem. We can measure 
both the foreign exchange and the employment generated by a project 
but the Ministries of Labor and Finance might be expected to disagree 
on the relative prices to be assigned to the two objectives. Note, 
however, that a problem can still exist with only a single prin-
cipal. This will occur if either the quantity cannot be established 
or if he is unable to decide on his own relative weighting. 
The main point, then, is that both the problems of multiple ob-
jectives and plural principals can be reduced to the fundamental un-
derlying difficulty of measurement. Difficulties such as these are of 
course not an obstacle but a challenge to the imagination of the aca-
demic community, and a variety of procedures have been proposed for 
dealing with the problem (e.g., through conjoint measurement the-
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3/ ory). The applicability of such procedures for alleviating the 
problem may be debated. Here, the only point is that the critical 
feature distinguishing various classes of objectives is the degree to 
which their achievement ¿an be quantified and prices, weights or 
trade-offs established. The question of the relationship between ob-
jectives and control devices can then be reformulated as follows: to 
what extent does the particular control device vary with the diffi-t 
culty of measuring objectives? To this question we now turn. 
III. CONTROL SYSTEMS 
A. Control Systems: The Issues 
It is useful to begin by defining - a "control system" in the 
broadest possible sense as the answer to the question: "who makes 
which decision and why.'" At the highest level of generality, the 
"who" answers may be confined to four foci: the government, the en-
terprise, the market, or the community. The "which" question is im-
portant because it emphasizes that there is no single optimal level of 
enterprise autonomy. If anything, the search is for an optimal pat-
tern of autonomy, since different decisions should ideally be made in 
different locations. The choice between different locations for a 
particular decision depends on the "why" question. Which individual 
or institution has the information, the professional capability and 
the motivation to use the decision-making power in the national inter-
est? 
3/h oward Raiffa, "Decision-Making in the State-Owned Enter-
prise." In State-Owned Enterprises in the Western Economies (pp. 
54-62), edit ed by Raymond Vernon and Yair Aharoni (New York: St. Mar-
tin's Press, 1981). 
The more typical view of the control system is narrower in two 
respects: first, it focuses on the distribution of autonomy between 
the enterprise and government, and more particularly on the distri-
bution within government; second it tends to ignore the "why" issues. 
It thus focuses on such choices as: legal form (departmental enter-
prise versus public corporation versus joint stock company); buffering 
(use of a holding company); type of parent ministry (single public en-
terprise ministry versus functional tutelary ministries); audit con-
trol (commercial auditor and/or governmental Board of Audit); etc. 
While such decisions are certainly important, the position taken here 
is that they are second-order decisions. First-order considerations 
involve which decisions should be left to government; it is a 
second-order consideration as to just where in government it should be 
taken. This is not to minimize the importance of the second-order 
decisions. They can be critical, as will be emphasized in other 
conference papers. Here, however, attention will be confined to the 
first-order question. 
i 
The market and the community must also be considered as alter-
native control devices. As already noted, markets are an alternative 
to ministers. In Turkey, credit allocations to public enterprises are 
made by ministry level decisions, with the (public) banks simply val-
idating the decision by issuing the required credit. -Many U.S. public 
authorities, on the other hand, h ave the power to isisue their own 
bonds in the market. This is sometimes described as giving the U.S. 
authority more autonomy. More correctly, however, it should be viewed 
as a shift in power from the minister to the market. In neither case 
can the manager issue his own credit. The difference is that in 
Turkey he has to convince ministers that he is credit worthy; in the 
other, he has to convince the market in the form of large private in-
stitutional investors. To be sure, the two control organs are likely 
to define "credit worthiness" in a quite different manner, creating 
quite different problems for managers, but it is by no means clear 
that the manager has "more" autonomy. The point is not that control 
via markets is necessarily superior to control via ministers. Indon-
esia's Pertamina was for many years allowed to borrow freely in inter-
national markets with disasterous results. The point is only that the 
market must be considered as an alternative to government control and 
one must ask in what circumstances one is superior to the other. Sim-
ilarly for community control, as will now be discussed with regard to 
the specific question of who sets objectives. 
B. Who is the Principal? Who is the Agent? 
One of the most important elements of the control system, and the 
one most germane to the present paper, is who sets objectives and 
why. The answer may seem obvious. Conceptually, it is usually held 
that the government is the shareholding principal and the enterprise 
the executing agent. It is then the function of the government to set 
objectives and the function of the enterprise to achieve them. De-
spite the obviousness of this notion, it has been disputed by at least 
two writers. 
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.4/ . . . . 
Aharoni has argued that the real principal is the public at 
large, for whom a variety of agents act, including political parties, 
the legislative and executive branches of government, and the public 
enterprises. In sho.rt, Hurwicz's "plural principals" become Aharoni's 
"abundant agents." Each agent's view of the public interest is influ-
enced by their own individual and group interests, thus diminishing 
their ability to establish trade-offs on behalf of the public. It is 
then not surprising that public enterprise managers sometmes view 
themselves as having at least as much of a claim on the objective-
setting function as their erstwhile bureaucratic and political supe-
riors. This particular view seems more common among public enterprise 
managers in individualistic societies such as Israel and the United 
States, and it is -easy to think of a number of reasons why the 
government might be preferred as a setter of objectives (more directly 
responsible to the people; superior unit in a hierarchy of agents; 
better equipped with information on broader social goals, etc.) 
Nonetheless, the basic question is legitimate in asking just which of 
a tier of agents is best suited to interpret the interests of the 
citizens who collectively constitute the true principal. Aharoni 
suggests a pragmatic solution in the form of an independent "goal au-
dit" which provides a periodic pub-lie forum for public scrutiny of the 
4/Yair Aharoni, "The State-Owned Enterprises: An Agent Without 
a Principal," in Public Enterprise in Less Developed Countries., edited 
by Leroy Jones with Richard Mallon, Edward Mason, Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan and Raymond Vernon (New York: Cambridge University Press,, 
forthcoming). 
^For a discussion of the impact of cultural differences on 
public enterprises, see: Ira Sharkansky, Wither the State: Pol itics 
and Public Enterprise in Three Countries (Chatham: Chatham House, 
TTIW. 
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actions of various agents. Howard^ shares Aharoni's skepticism of 
relying solely on government, but suggests that the problems arising 
from a chain of agents can be short-circuited by direct community in-
put in the form of worker, community and consumer representation on 
Boards of Directors and by legal and other institutional intermediary 
groups to watch over the public interest. 
The question then is which agent, under which circumstances, is 
best qualified to set objectives on behalf of the public principal. 
In particular, does the answer vary with the type of objective? In a 
loose sense it seems apparent that the more important non-commercial 
objectives are, the greater the need for Aharoni/Howard kinds of 
checks on the objective setting powers of the government. There is of 
course a logical circularity here with the class of objective 
determining the appropriate agent who in turn chooses the objective, 
etc. Nonetheless, it seems to make sense to argue that commun-
ity/public input is much more important for activities such as a re-
gional development bank, where non-commercial objectives dominate. In 
such a situation, the community/public representatives constitute a 
sample whose preferences might be taken as the basis for some Raiffa 
type of weighting procedure to establish trade-offs. The 
Aharoni/Howard suggestions then become means for mitigating the meas-
urement problem. At the other extreme, such steps might be trivial 
for a purely commercial oil exporter whose sole function is to gen-
erate surplus to be handed over to the government. 
John Howard, "The Social Accountability of P-ubl ic Enter-
prises: Law and Community Controls in the New Development Strat-
egies," in Jones with others. 
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C. A Model Control System 
If the preceding problem is solved and a proxy principal (best 
individual or collective) established for the enterprise, then what 
should the distribution of other decisions be as between the govern-
ment and the enterprise? The optimal pattern, if there is such a 
thing, will of course vary across activities, across countries, and 
across organizations with different histories. Nonetheless, a useful 
starting point can come from viewing the public enterprise sector as a 
particular variant of a more general organizational form. To a con-
siderable extent the public enterprise sector can be treated (like a 
multinational corporation) as a special case of the rnultidivisional 
firm. The parent Ministry functions as the head office, the sector 
corporation is the regional or product-line division and the companies 
are operating units. In such organizations, what classes of decisions 
ought to be made at the center, and which at the periphery? More 
generally, what decisions should be made by any superior unit in a 
hierarchy? The answers provided to these questions by Williamson^ 
8/ 
(for the multi-divisional firm) and Jaques (for general hier-
archies) are surprisingly similar and may be paraphrased as follows, 
The head office (or superior unit) should: 
1) set objectives; 
2) evaluate performance according to those objectives; 
7/01i ver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (New York: The 
Free Press, 1975), pp. 132-154. 
^/Elliot Jaques, A General Theory of Bureaucracy (London: 
Heinemann, 1976), pp. 62-86. 
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3) reward and penalize the chief executive officer according to 
that evaluation; 
4) appoint the chief executive officers; 
5) provide resources .( finance); 
6) conduct long-range planning and coordination among units; and 
7) do (almost) nothing else. 
There are thus six narrow prescriptions and one broad proscrip-
tion. The proscription is particularly important since it is so often 
violated. To the extent it is violated, it is no longer possible to 
hold managers accountable for performance according to objectives. 
The advantages of hierarchical specialization then break down. 
D. Sources of Degeneration 
If the foregoing provides an appealing normative pattern for pub-
lic enterprises, then has the control problem been solved? Unfor-
tunately not, for there is an organizatina1 second-best problem in-
volved. That is, there is an interdependence among the seven precepts 
such that if one is violated, it. is no longer optimal to follow the 
others. Most importantly, if the prescriptions concerning setting ob-
jectives and rewarding achievement fail because of measurement prob-
lems, then it is no longer necessarily desirable to follow the pro-
scription. 
It is widely held that excessive government intervention in the 
internal affairs of enterprises is due to reasons such as civil serv-
ice traditions, political interference, failure of bureaucrats to un-
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derstand management practices, etc. While such illegitimate reasons 
for interference of course are common, it is important to recognize 
that there are legitimate reasons as well. Briefly, if the government 
cannot exercise control oyer results (because it cannot measure and 
reward performance), then it must exercise control over processes. 
To illustrate, consider the determination of the level of working 
capital. In a private enterprise the power to set the level of work-
ing capital is almost invariably delegated to the chief executive of-
ficer by the shareholders and the Board of Directors. The assumption 
is that the manager will keep as much working capital as necessary for 
efficient operation, but no more, since the funds could otherwise be 
used to generate income directly (in economists' jargon, he will 
acquire working capital only up to a point where its marginal cost 
equals its marginal revenue). The reason that this is a safe as-
sumption is that the manager is judged and rewarded on the basis of 
profit, which will rise or fall (in part) according to the correctness 
of decisions on the level of working capital. The board can therefore 
exercise its control function by examining outcomes (profit) rather 
than the process by which the outcome is generated. If, on the other 
hand, the manager has little or no reason to be concerned with raising 
the profit of the firm, then he might not be expected to make the cor-
rect decision on the level of working capital. He might divert funds 
from more productive uses by keeping levels of inventory and cash far 
beyond the level necessitated by prudent management, so as to reduce 
risk and avoid any possible difficult decision—it is after all easier 
to keep all your funds in a checking deposit account than to con-
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stantly shuttle them between short and long-term interest-bearing de-
posits. Or, he might wish to have the working capital available to 
absorb possible losses and hence disguise inefficiency and keep the 
enterprise from being shut. down. In such situations, the shareholder 
cannot wholly delegate the working capital decision. 
In the case of public enterprise there are two reasons for gov-
ernment involvment in the working capital decision. The first is mac-
roeconomic control of the aggregate level of credit. This, however, 
could be accomplished by setting an overall credit ceiling to be al-
located by price rationing. This effective delegation to the market 
would fail, however, if it were feared that managers would take "too 
much" regardless of the price. As a result of this second reason, „ 
various representatives of the government—often high level—can find 
themselves involved in trying to take detailed decisions as to just 
what constitutes legitimate working capital levels for individual 
firms. The difficulties are that the process is time consuming, that 
the ministries often lack the information and the business expertise 
to know just what levels are "reasonable" and that scarce ministerial 
talent could be better used elsewhere. In sum, by any. standard of 
modern management, the"working capital decision should be delegated to 
the enterprise, but given inadequate measurement and reward of 
objective achievement, it often cannot be. 
The foregoing is merely one minor instance of a more general phe-
nomenon. It also can explain ministerial involvement in hiring of 
middle-level-management, wage setting, procurement policies, foreign 
travel, and much else. The legitimate explanation is that when the 
principal cannot control outcomes, he must control processes. Delega-
tion of operational decisions to an agent presupposes effective con-
trol of outcomes. This in turn requires that desirable outcomes be 
quantified and that there is some incentive mechanism to insure that 
the manager cares about the outcome. In sum, when the prescriptions 
are not carried out, then it is often legitimate to violate the pro-
scription, legitimizing intervention as an organizational second-best 
solution. 
We have now identified another link between objectives and poli-
cies. When objectives are measureable, then a much broader class of 
decisions can be delegated to the enterprise and the market. 
IV. DISSENT, SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Muddling Through: A Dissenting View 
The paper you have been reading was obviously written by a nar-
rowly technical economist with a naive faith in a rational decision-1 
making process based on clear specification of goals, establishment of 
trade-offs involving conflicting parties, followed by judicious choice 
of "least-cost" means of achieving those goals selected from among a 
comprehensive set of alternatives. This is all very fine in theory, 
but it is not the way things work in the real world. More im-
portantly, it is not the way things should work. Lindbloom and others 
have argued that: i 
"such a synopt ic or comprehensive attempt at problem sol-
ving is not possible to the degree that clarification of 
objectives founders on social conflict, that required in-
formation is either not available or available only at pro-
hibitive cost, or that the problem is simply too complex 
for man's finite intellectual capacities."^/ 
Instead, public policy decisions require a process of "muddling 
through" on "disjointed incrementalism" in which conflict is minimized 
and consensus built by explicitly avoiding focusing on goals, let alone 
quantifying trade-offs; rather, concern is focused on marginal changes 
from existing policies with the aim of forging temporary coalitions 
amongst interest groups who can agree on a particular policy while 
disagreeing fundamentally on basic objectives. 
One piece of evidence for this view is the limited success 
(failure?) of HcNamara's whiz-kids in implementing program budgeting, 
systems analysis, cost-effectiveness studies and other technocratic 
solutions in the U.S. Department of Defense. For the public enterprise 
91 
sector, Murthy has argued that one of the major "Stage One" tasks of 
managers is to adapt to an environment of plural principals by choosing 
9/A. 0. Hirschman and C. E. Lindblom, "Economic Development, Re-
search and Development, Policy Making: Some Converging Views" (Behav-
ioral Science Vol. 7, 1962, pp. 211-222). For the seminal article, 
see: C. E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through.'" (Public Ad-
ministration Review, Spring 1959, pp. 79-88). For a review of Lindblom 
and an attempted synthesis with the technocratic approach, see: Charles 
L. Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending, (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1968). For a selection of papers on related 
issues, see: Ryan C. Amacher, Robert P. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett 
(editors), The Economic Approach to Public Policy: Selected Readings 
(Ithaca: Cornell Universty Press, 1976). 
IO/K. R. S. Murthy, "Strategic Management of Public Enterprises: 
A Framework for Analysis." Paper presented at the Second BAPEG 
Conference on Public Enterprise in Mixed Economy LDC's, Boston, April 
1980. 
policies which reflect consensus or at least do not provoke opposition. 
To the extent he is successful in this effort, he is delegated increased 
autonomy and moves to a stage two of public enterprise evolution. ^ 
i 
B. An Attempt at Synthesis for the Public Manufacturing Sector 
As always, a synthesis is possible, whether or not it is desirable. 
The tactic is to bifurcate activities according to whether the prepon-
derance of relevant objectives is commercial or non-commemrcial. At one 
extreme are decisions such as the trade-off between F-16 fighters and el-
ementary education, or between redistributing jobs or income to one eth-
nic group, class or income decile. Here, synoptic rationality is inap-
propriate and disjointed incrementalism is unavoidable. The critical 
premise for this paper is that the activities of public manufacturing en-
terprises lie much nearer the other end of the spectrum, with non-
commercial operational objectives being a small share of the total. An 
integrated steel mill in a backward area may have a legitimate non-
commercial objective of contributing to community development through 
road-building, etc., but whatever value is put on such an activity will 
be small relative to the value of the steel output and the energy'and 
iron inputs. For such an enterprise even large errors in measurement of 
non-commercial objectives will be a small share of total enterprise 
performance. Accordingly, efforts to commercialize non-commercial 
objectives through program contracts or social adjustment accounts, 
however imperfect, will involve acceptable margins of error. In this 
scheme the primary operational objective of the manufacturing sector is 
to generate surplus for transfer to the government for use for other 
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public purposes, with secondary non-connercial objectives being quan-
tified and treated as dividends-in-kind. The distribution of surplus at 
the government level is necessarily governed by a muddling through deci-
sion process, but the generation of surplus at the enterprise level can 
be governed by synoptic rationalism. 
This is of course contrary to common practice, since much public 
enterprise decision making is more aptly described by the model of dis-
jointed incrementalism than that of synoptic rationalism. This may be 
defended but the price is high in terms of resulting cost ineffi-
ciencies. I have calculated—^ that the benefits from improving public 
enterprise efficiency by only 5% would: 
1) in Egypt, amount to about five percent of GDP, equivalent to 
seventy-five percent of all government direct taxes or enough to 
triple government expenditures on education; 
2) in Pakistan, amount to about 1% of GDP, equivalent to 53% of di-
rect taxes or enough to fund a 46% increase in government expen-
ditures on education; 
3) in South Korea, amount to 1.7% of GDP or over one billion 
dollars in 1981. 
¿.^"Improving the Operational Efficiency of Public Industrial En-
terprises in Egypt." Report for the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment, August 1981. 
"Efficiency of Public Manufacturing Enterprises in Pakistan." 
Report for Pakistan Ministry of'Production and the World Bank, February 
1981. 
"Comments on Development of a Performance Evaluation System for 




This paper may be summarized in the following propositions. 
1) For control purposes, the most important way in which objectives 
differ is in the ease with which they can be measured. 
2) Where objectives are raeasureable, then a pure model of prin-
cipal/agent relationships can be applied and the appropriate 
control system consists of six prescriptive functions to be car-
ried out by the government with all remaining decisions dele-
gated to the enterprise and the market. 
3) Where objectives are not raeasureable then the hierarchical model 
breaks down and an inchoate process of "muddling through" must 
be resorted to. This can result in legitimate government inter-
vention in the internal operations of the firm and has major ef-
ficiency costs. 
4) Most, if not all, public enterprises have both commercial and 
non-commercial objectives, but in the manufacturing sector the 
operational non-commercial objectives are generally small rela-
tive to the total, rendering acceptable the errors in meas-
urement inherent in devices for commercializing objectives such 
as program contracts or social adjustment accounting. Once such 
devices are in place, the model referred to above provides a 
norm towards which reform of the control system can aim. 
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